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long-term survival of  the collectivity. Intrasocietal tensions can, of  course, take many 
forms, and thus might both manifest themselves, and respond to control, in any num-
ber of  ways. What distinguishes federalism from other methods of  internal social ten-
sion control is the specific mechanism to which it resorts: the deliberate creation and 
perpetual maintenance of  partially autonomous subnational polities within a larger 
polity that is national, and therefore in some meaningful sense unified.1
The dominant characteristic of  federal systems is thus a plan of  institutional design 
that channels the most serious anticipated intrasocietal tensions into the mold of  
national-subnational conflict. Once contained within that arena, conflicts are then 
managed in federal systems through maintenance of  a careful—and sometimes sur-
prisingly flexible and responsive—balance between the powers, competencies, and ulti-
mately the political salience of  national and subnational institutions of  self-governance. 
Most constitutional systems seek to establish their own permanence by creating firm and 
static ground rules in a unique constitutional founding.2 Federal systems, in contrast, 
attempt to secure their own permanence by establishing a system of  intergovernmental 
 contestation that produces a perpetually moving yet dynamically stable equipoise.3
Although the precise tools available to governments for engaging each other in 
these intergovernmental tests of  strength can vary considerably depending upon the 
details of  the relevant constitutional order,4 they generally fall into one of  two related 
categories: exercising power and claiming power. The idea that national and subna-
tional governments struggle against one another by deploying powers they indisput-
ably command is perhaps most familiar in the “mutual checking” theory of  federalism 
propounded by James Madison. In Madison’s account, the dispersion of  power among 
national and subnational governments protects liberty by preventing a potentially 
catastrophic concentration of  power at either level.5 National and subnational gov-
ernments then exercise their powers to compete for popular allegiance,6 either affir-
matively, by using their powers to achieve substantively good outcomes preferred by 
their respective polities; or negatively, by deploying their powers against the other to 
impede, thwart, or otherwise “check” its capacity to achieve outcomes that are sub-
stantively bad.7
1 William H.  RikeR, FedeRalism: ORigin, OpeRatiOn, signiFicance 11 (1964); Daniel J.  Elazar, Introduction, in 
FedeRal systems OF tHe WORld, at xv (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 2d ed. 1994).
2 This is certainly the governing premise of  social contract theory. See, e.g., JOHn lOcke, tHe secOnd tReatise OF 
gOveRnment ¶ 220 (Thomas P. Pearson, ed. 1952 [1690]) (“When the government is dissolved, the people are at 
liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative, differing from the other by the change of  persons 
or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good.”). On the importance of  constitutional 
foundings, see also tHe FedeRalist, nO. 1 (Hamilton); BRuce ackeRman, We tHe peOple: FOundatiOns 205 (1991).
3 Arthur Benz & Jörg Broschek, Federal Dynamics: Introduction, in FedeRal dynamics: cOntinuity, cHange, and 
tHe vaRieties OF FedeRalism 1, 2, 7, 14 (Arthur Benz & Jörg Broschek eds., 2013).
4 We describe some of  the tools available in two systems in James A.  Gardner & Antoni Abat i Ninet, 
Sustainable Decentralization: Power, Extraconstitutional Influence, and Subnational Symmetry in the United 
States and Spain, 59 am. J. cOmp. l. 491 (2011).
5 tHe FedeRalist, nOs. 48–51 (Madison).
6 Id., nO. 46 (Madison), nO. 28 (Hamilton).
7 James a. gaRdneR, inteRpReting state cOnstitutiOns ch. 3 (2005); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to 
Process: The Jurisprudence of  Federalism after Garcia, sup. ct. Rev. 341, 380–395 [1985].
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The second strategy of  contestation available to governments in federal states con-
cerns not exercising power, but claiming it. Because federalism creates a system of  
competition among governments by dividing power, governments have obvious incen-
tives to struggle over the constitutional allocation of  power. While all constitutional 
systems tend to evolve in response to changes and pressures arising in their immediate 
environment,8 “in a federal government the problem is even more acute because the 
distribution of  powers between states and nation gives rise to demands for shifts in the 
allocation of  functions from one government to the other.”9 In federal states, in other 
words, the precise allocation of  power between national and subnational govern-
ments is a source of  constant contention and dispute, one that is, moreover, “particu-
larly prone to entrepreneurial redefinition.”10 In these circumstances, the contest is 
waged on a different playing field: any available constitutional flexibility “is . . . likely to 
be exploited by some national or subnational actors who continuously seek to extend 
their power by changing the rules of  the game and the allocation of  resources, thus 
producing permanent instability.”11
Federalism, then, is a structure of  governance that is likely to be in nearly 
constant motion.12 Federalism expressly contemplates, and indeed invites, inter-
governmental contestation not only within the established constitutional frame-
work, but over the dimensions of  the constitutional framework itself. The regular 
and predictable outbreak of  these kinds of  conflicts thus reflects not a design 
flaw but the existence of  a healthy, well-functioning, and indeed organically alive 
federal system.13
In prior work, we have concentrated on cataloguing and analyzing the wide array 
of  constitutional and extra-constitutional tools to which some subnational govern-
ments have at times resorted in order to influence and, when necessary, to thwart 
and undermine exercises of  national power that they view as inimical to national 
or subnational interests and commitments. Such tactics include, for example, with-
holding requested cooperation, exerting political influence through party channels, 
bringing pressure through popular political mobilization, appealing to suprana-
tional organizations, filing lawsuits, and even engaging in open and illegal defiance 
of  national authority.14 Here, in contrast, we focus on one particular subnational 
tactic for contesting national authority: claims of  distinctive identity or sovereignty 
(“DIS claims”).
8 William s. livingstOn, FedeRalism and cOnstitutiOnal cHange 11, 295–318 (1956).
9 Id. at 11–12.
10 Jörg Broschek, Conceptualizing and Theorizing Constitutional Change in Federal Systems: Insights from 
Historical Institutionalism, 21 RegiOnal & Fed. stud. 539, 548 (2011).
11 César Colino, Constitutional Change without Constitutional Reform: Spanish Federalism and the Revision of  
Catalonia’s Statute of  Autonomy, 39 puBlius 262, 263 (2009).
12 Benz & Broschek, supra note 3, at 2.
13 Jenna BednaR, tHe ROBust FedeRatiOn: pRinciples OF design (2009).
14 See Gardner & Abat, supra note 4, at 498–503, 507–512; gaRdneR, supra note 7, at 87–120. Regarding 
such tactics in the US case, see also JOHn d.  nugent, saFeguaRding FedeRalism: HOW states pROtect tHeiR 
inteRests in natiOnal pOlicymaking (2009).
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DIS claims are claims by subnational units either to a distinctive subnational iden-
tity, whether ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or political, or to an enhanced measure of  
sovereignty within the federation based on such distinctiveness. We view DIS claims as 
predominantly instrumental, and thus typically asserted for the purpose of  obtaining 
some benefit. Most often, DIS claims are made in the course of  jockeying for improved 
position within the federation. The subnational unit may, for example, seek a more 
generous allocation of  constitutional competencies, or it may wish for greater defer-
ence from national actors toward exercises of  subnational power, and believes that 
recognition of  its distinctiveness by other actors in the federal system will help pro-
duce the desired result. At the margins, DIS claims can be made to justify actual or 
threatened secession—itself  an important bargaining tool in federations15—or to take 
up present positions that make the possibility of  future secession more credible. But 
regardless of  whether they are asserted to back secession threats or merely to gain a 
marginally improved position in routine intergovernmental contestation, DIS claims 
are among the more aggressive tactics available to subnational units to get their way 
in struggles with national governments.
As will be seen below, DIS claims are most often asserted initially in political 
fora—for example, in intergovernmental ministerial negotiations or in national leg-
islative committees—and addressed to national actors in the executive and legisla-
tive branches. Our main focus here, however, is what happens when DIS claims are 
made or subjected to examination in judicial forums, in particular the national con-
stitutional court. In these venues, they seem to receive a uniformly hostile reaction. 
The aim of  the article is to explain why DIS claims receive such negative treatment in 
judicial forums, a result we attribute to the distinct institutional position of  national 
courts in federal systems.
The balance of  this article is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our data, which 
comprises a small but, so far as we have been able to determine, complete set of  deci-
sions by constitutional courts squarely addressing and fully analyzing in constitu-
tional terms DIS claims made by subnational units. These rulings issue from the courts 
of  four federal or quasi-federal states—Spain, Italy, the United States, and Canada—
and one unitary state, France. The decisions offer a rich variety of  circumstances for 
judicial consideration. Some cases involve a negotiated political settlement in which 
the national government recognizes and makes significant concessions in response 
to subnational DIS claims (Spain, France). In others, subnational units unilaterally 
assert DIS claims in processes that have been nationally approved (Italy), nationally 
disapproved (United States), or are subjects of  ongoing and inconclusive negotiation 
(Canada).
Regardless of  the circumstances, however, the national constitutional courts in our 
sample reject subnational DIS claims. They draw no distinction between DIS claims 
asserted in the context of  actual or threatened secession and those asserted dur-
ing routine jockeying for position in the course of  intergovernmental contestation. 
Nor do the courts distinguish between DIS claims made unilaterally by subnational 
15 BednaR, supra note 13, at 77–85.
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governments and those agreed to by the national government in the course of  negoti-
ated intergovernmental political settlements. Instead, all such claims are rejected as a 
matter of  national constitutional law. Moreover, the judicial treatment of  DIS claims 
in the four federal states is no more accommodating or deferential than it is in the uni-
tary state in our sample, suggesting that the presence of  a federal structure matters 
less to national judicial actors than it does to national executive and legislative actors.
Section 3 turns to analysis of  the reasons for the different and hostile treatment of  
DIS claims in constitutional courts. We argue that this result is best explained by the 
distinct institutional position of  national constitutional courts, and we explore four 
aspects of  the judiciary’s institutional role that might be relevant. First, constitutional 
courts may be more likely to understand their role as enforcing the constitutional bar-
gain than to understand it to include making the constitutional bargain work in prac-
tice. Second, unlike national executives and legislatures, which engage in constant 
contestation with subnational units, constitutional courts are not repeat players in 
these kinds of  conflicts, and thus may lack a perspective that might encourage greater 
tolerance of  DIS claims as mere moves in an ongoing process of  mutual competition.
Third, as organs of  the national government, constitutional courts may not be quite 
the impartial referees they appear to be when intervening in intergovernmental con-
tests, and there are reasons to believe that they may sometimes have incentives not 
only to favor the exercise of  power at the national level, but to favor assertions of  their 
own power over conflicting assertions of  national executive and legislative power.
Finally, national constitutional courts may be hostile to informal rearrangements 
of  the constitutional allocation of  powers if  they understand themselves to have a 
special role to play in the protection of  national minorities, especially those that in a 
federation are weak on account of  being geographically dispersed. National recogni-
tion of  DIS claims often occurs in informal bilateral negotiations between national 
and subnational officials, a process from which many constitutional stakeholders may 
be excluded. National constitutional courts appear especially sensitive to this kind of  
bilateralism. By rejecting informal settlements, and thereby insisting that constitu-
tional changes be made exclusively in formal processes of  constitutional amendment, 
national constitutional courts may see themselves as discharging a distinct respon-
sibility to ensure to all relevant stakeholders an appropriate place at the bargaining 
table. This possibility in turn raises difficult questions of  judicial choice concerning 
which national minorities are entitled to the court’s solicitude.
2. Subnational DIS claims in national constitutional courts
Before examining the rulings of  the constitutional courts, a preliminary word is in 
order about the states represented in our sample. The pitfalls of  case selection can be a 
particularly acute problem in the comparative study of  federalism. The number of  fed-
eral states is small—perhaps a dozen or two, depending upon how one counts—and 
they diverge widely along many relevant dimensions. A rigorous working definition 
of  federalism helps assure the similarity of  states compared, but confines the breadth 
and power of  inferences because of  the small size of  both the sample and the universe 
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by hypothesis deemed relevant. A more generous definition allows more powerful and 
far-reaching inferences, but carries a risk of  inaccuracy by sweeping in sample varia-
tion that the analysis may not take into account.
Here, we have opted for a more inclusive set of  criteria.16 We think, however, that 
the choice is well justified for two reasons. First, the objects we are comparing—a par-
ticularly narrow class of  judicial rulings—are so few in number that the only way 
to generate even a modest sample size is to take an inclusive approach. Second, as 
will appear below, the reasonableness of  this choice is, in our view, confirmed by the 
remarkable similarity of  the rulings and the analytic concepts invoked by the various 
courts. Finally, as will be seen in Section 3, we compensate for the risks of  an inclusive 
comparison by practicing modesty in our inferences and conclusions. Thus, rather 
than purporting to derive a definitive explanation of  the phenomenon we describe, we 
offer instead several possible, alternative accounts, and invite readers to use their own 
judgment in assessing the plausibility of  the alternatives we adduce.
We turn now to the rulings of  the constitutional courts themselves. In each 
instance, we attempt to contextualize the judicial rulings by providing background 
information on the history of  national-subnational conflict in the state at issue and 
the events, if  any, leading up to the particular conflict that ends up in court. This sec-
tion accordingly discusses rulings by the constitutional courts of  four federal or quasi-
federal states: Spain, Italy, the United States, and Canada. We set the stage, however, 
perhaps paradoxically, with an intergovernmental dispute and subsequent judicial 
ruling from a non-federal state—France.
2.1. France and Corsica
France is often held up as the exemplar of  a modern unitary state.17 The French 
Constitution opens by declaring France “an indivisible . . . Republic.”18 It provides 
explicitly that “national sovereignty shall vest in the people”19—by which it means 
the entire French people—and declares that “no section of  the people may arrogate 
16 In our sample, the United States and Canada are, by consensus, deemed indisputably federal. See, e.g., 
ROnald l. Watts, cOmpaRing FedeRal systems 29–30, 32–33 (3d ed. 2008). Italy is generally thought of  as 
a non-federal state engaged in a process of  regionalization that may in the end make it federal. Compare 
id. at 25 (not listing Italy even among “quasi-federal” states or “emerging federations”) with Francesco 
Palermo, Italy: A Federal Country without Federalism?, in cOnstitutiOnal dynamics in FedeRal systems: suB-
natiOnal peRspectives 237 (Michael Burgess & G. Alan Tarr, eds. 2012) (arguing that Italy has the institu-
tions of  federalism but not its politics). Whether Spain counts as federal is a question that has engaged 
many scholars. For an overview, see, e.g., Gemma Sala, Federalism without Adjectives in Spain, 44 puBlius 
109 (2013). Making the problem even more complex is the fact that even core theoretical definitions of  
federalism can change over time. See, e.g., Carl J. Friedrich, The Political Theory of  Federalism, in FedeRalism 
and supReme cOuRts and tHe integRatiOn OF legal systems 34 (Edward McWhinney & Pierre Pescatore, eds., 
1973) (noting a “profound transformation” in the concept of  federalism from one centered on competen-
cies to one centered on “process”).
17 nORman dORsen et  al., cOmpaRative cOnstitutiOnalism 429 (2d ed. 2010); Xavier Philippe, France: The 
Amendment of  the French Constitution “On the Decentralized Organization of  the Republic,” 2 int’l J. cOnst’l l. 
691, 692 (2004).
18 cOnstitutiOn OF FRance (1958), art. I.
19 Id., art. 3.
384 I•CON 14 (2016), 378–410
to itself  . . . the exercise thereof,”20 thus excluding a federal form of  organization. 
Nevertheless, this constitutional declaration of  national unity ignores a degree of  
internal diversity that has on occasion erupted into calls for local recognition and 
sovereignty.21
Corsica is a small island lying off  the coasts of  France and Italy that, after chang-
ing imperial masters many times over several centuries, was acquired permanently by 
France in 1768, becoming a départment following the French Revolution.22 Along with 
French and Italian, Corsican (curso), a language considered by UNESCO to be “poten-
tially endangered,” is spoken on the island, and Corsicans appear to have plausible 
grounds to claim some degree of  cultural distinctiveness.23 In any event, a “growing 
renewed awareness of  a specifically Corsican identity . . . took a political turn in the 
1960s with calls for greater self-determination.”24 The French government responded 
to these demands with a series of  measures, each devolving additional power and 
autonomy to local Corsican governments.
In 1960, shortly following the birth of  the Fifth Republic, Corsica was attached 
for administrative purposes to the region of  Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, one of  
twenty-one circonscriptions d’action régionale.25 This arrangement was altered 
in 1972 when the circonscriptions were redenominated régions, and authorized 
to adopt competencies, create regional councils, and exercise certain finan-
cial powers.26 In 1975, Corsica was detached from Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 
and became the twenty-second région, thus acquiring regional competencies 
20 Id.
21 See, generally, John Bell, Devolution: French Style, 6 euR. puB. l. 139 (2000) (describing demands for devo-
lution and self-governance relating to Polynesia and New Caledonia). French legal and political culture 
has been an obstacle to the recognition of  regional diversity and granting of  local political autonomy. 
Farimah Daftery, The Matignon Process and Insular Autonomy as a Response to Self-determination Claims, 
2001(2) euR. yBk 302, 306 (2003). Due to the founding constitutional principles of  the indivisibility 
of  the Republic and the equality of  French citizen before the law, “France has been reluctant to develop 
asymmetric solutions and to grant collective rights.” Id.
22 gRace l. HudsOn, cORsica, at xxi–xxiii (1997).
23 On the status of  the Corsican language, see UNESCO Red Book, available at http://www.helsinki.
fi/~tasalmin/europe_index.html; on Corsican culture, see HudsOn, supra note 22, at xxvii–xxix. The use 
of  curso persisted well into the twentieth century, and French only became widely spoken in Corsica 
after World War II. Kathleen Cunningham, Divided and Conquered: Why States and Self-determination 
Groups Fail in Bargaining over Autonomy 92 (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, UC Sand Diego, 2007), 
available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3rk9m7gk#page-122. Corsica’s distinctiveness has been 
enhanced partly due to its physical separation from mainland France: id; Daftery, supra note 21, at 302; 
Helen Hintjens, John Loughlin, & Claude Olivesi, The Status of  Maritime and Insular France: The DOM-TOM 
and Corsica, in tHe end OF tHe FRencH unitaRy state? 121 (John Loughlin & Sonai Masey eds., 1995), and to 
its economic insularity and lack of  development. Daftery, supra note 21, at 302–303.
24 HudsOn, supra note 22, at xxix. Post-war economic and social decline led some Corsicans to advocate radi-
cal solutions including autonomy within France or complete independence in the early 1970s. Hintjens 
et al., supra note 23, at 121; Daftery, supra note 21, at 303; Cunningham, supra note 23, at 92–94. For a 
concise account of  Corsica’s identity claims in different eras, see Hintjens et al., supra note 23, at 121. For 
more detail, see Daftery, supra note 21, at 303.
25 Decree No. 60 516 of  June 2, 1960. The Region of  Paris had a special organization regulated by Law No. 
64–707 of  July 10, 1964.
26 Law 72–619 of  July 5, 1972.
Distinctive identity claims in federal systems: Judicial policing of  subnational variance 385
of  its own. It was, however, divided into two départements, Haute-Corse and 
Corse-du-sud.27
The pace of  decentralization picked up significantly in 1982, when Corsica became 
France’s only collectivité territoriale “de plein exercise,” a status not achieved by the rest of  
the Regions for another four years, with its own organization, competences and specific 
resources.28 The same law authorized the creation of  the Corsican Assembly (Assemblée 
de Corse)—a significant elevation of  Corsica’s status among the Regions, the rest of  
which were permitted only a Regional Council (conseil regional) rather than an assem-
blée.29 Although President Mitterand purported to support the change of  terminology 
as a mere linguistic concession,30 the word assemblée has important historical and sym-
bolic resonance in France, and its use “reflected the fact that the Corsican Assembly 
had greater competences than other régions . . . .”31 In addition, unlike the Regional 
Councils, which were elected from départements on a constituency basis, election to the 
Corsican Assembly was from a single Corsican constituency by means of  proportional 
representation,32 an innovation intended to “give [the Assembly] a greater feeling of  
identity and unity.”33 Finally, the 1982 law created a unique pathway for Corsican 
influence on national policy making. Under these procedures, the Corsican govern-
ment was authorized to propose directly to the Prime Minister amendments to national 
regulations and laws concerning cultural affairs, local development, and other areas 
of  express Corsican competence, to which the Prime Minister was obliged to respond.34
Despite these reforms, Corsican nationalist demands continued to intrude into 
French politics, and in 1990 the Socialist government of  François Mitterand took 
up the issue as part of  a more comprehensive package of  policies that promoted 
27 The decision to opt for “bidepartmentalization” was made by the Corsican Government and ratified by the 
Municipal Councils of  Ajaccio and Bastia, the General Council, and the assemblies. This administrative 
reform changed in some sense an 1811 Napoleonic Decree that unified the two previous entities, Golo 
and Liamone, in a unique department. Corsica thus settled upon an arrangement that made it bidepart-
mental but a sole region. La documentation française, L’évolution institutionnelle de l’île, http://www.
ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/corse/evolution-institutionnelle.shtml (last visited 12 May, 2016); 
Conseil departementale de la Corse du Sud, Du département de la Corse au département de la Corse du 
Sud, http://www.cg-corsedusud.fr/collectivite-departementale/son-histoire/.
28 Law No. 82–214 of  March 2, 1982. This recognition of  Corsica’s special character was later diluted 
by a more general process of  decentralization during 1982–1986, which extended similar measures 
to the other regions. This “banalization” of  the Corsican statute, “which was no longer very special” 
coupled with “a certain withdrawal by the state and the erratic functioning of  the regional institutions in 
Corsica” led to demands for new reform of  the Corsican statute. Hintjens et al., supra note 23, at 122; see 
also Daftery, supra note 21, at 307.
29 See Law No. 82–214 of  Mar. 2, 1982, “on the particular statute of  the region of  Corsica: administrative 
organization.”
30 http://www.droitconstitutionnel.net/Corsestatut.htm.
31 Claudina Richards, Devolution in France: the Corsican Problem, 10 Eur. Pub. L. 481, 484 (2004).
32 Direction de l’Information Légale et Administrative, Découverte des institutions: Approfondissement, la vie 
puBlique, www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/
33 Richards, supra note 31, at 484. This arrangement was upheld by the cOnseil cOnstitutiOnnel [CC] 
[cOnstitutiOnal cOuRt] Decision no. 82–138 DC, Feb. 25, 1982, which ruled that the creation of  a cat-
egory of  administrative unit containing only a single member did not violate the constitutional principle 
of  the indivisibility of  the French Republic.
34 Law no. 82–214 of  Mar. 2, 1982, art. 27.
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decentralization of  government authority generally, as well as harmonization of  the 
status of  French territories and overseas possessions specifically.35 Under the leader-
ship of  Interior Secretary Pierre Joxe, the French government enacted a new statute in 
1991 that gave Corsica a unique and novel status among French subnational units.36 
The statut Joxe, inspired by French law relating to the territory of  French Polynesia,37 
created a new entity, the Corsican Territorial Collectivity. The statute required the 
French Prime Minister to consult the Corsican Assembly on drafts of  laws and decrees 
containing provisions specific to Corsica. New competences granted by the statut Joxe 
related to education, communication, cultural activities, the environment, and trans-
portation. Under the 1991 law, these competences were to be exercised according to 
a process by which the Assembly of  Corsica developed a plan which would become 
enforceable after a period of  consultation with the State.
Most significant for present purposes, however, is the opening section of  the 1991 
statute. That section adopted a tactic that earlier devolutionary provisions had not—
it made an express DIS claim. In highly sensitive and closely scrutinized language, 
Article 1 declared in explicit terms:
The French Republic guarantees to the historical and culturally living community which con-
stitutes the Corsican people, part of  the French people, the rights to preserve its cultural iden-
tity and to defend its specific economic and social interests. These rights of  insularity are to be 
exercised with respect for national unity, within the constitutional framework, the laws of  the 
Republic, and the present statute.38
Earlier laws creating asymmetrical advantages for Corsica may of  course very well 
have been enacted in response to Corsican claims, asserted in political forums and 
addressed primarily to the French parliament and executive, of  historical, cultural, 
and linguistic distinctiveness. The 1991 statute went further, however, by writing 
such sentiments into national law.39
In a decision issued in May 1991, the French Conseil constitutionnel invalidated 
this provision on constitutional grounds.40 Although the court had previously 
35 Richards, supra note 31, at 488.
36 Law no. 91–428 of  May 13, 1991.
37 Law no. 84–240 of  Sept. 6, 1984.
38 Law no. 91–428 of  May 13, 1991, art. 1:
 La République française garantit à la communauté historique culturelle vivante que constituait le peuple 
corse, composante du peuple français, les droits à la préservation de son identité culturelle et à la défense 
de ses intérêts économiques et sociaux spécifiques. Ces droits, liés à l’insularité, s’exercent dans le respect 
de l’unité nationale, dans le cadre de la Constitution, des lois de la République et du présent statut.
 Note that the phrase “droits, liés à l’insularité” is translated on the website of  the Conseil constitutionnel 
as “rights that flow from its island status.”
39 The expression peuple corse was included in the original version of  the earlier 1982 statute, but was 
replaced, after objection, with a compromise phrase recognizing “[t]he Corsican people, a compo-
nent of  the French people,” which was relocated from the bill’s text to a section on legislative purpose. 
Cunningham, supra note 23, at 101.
40 The Conseil constitutionnel is a hybrid body that exercises a mix of  administrative and judicial functions, 
but serves as the functional equivalent of  a constitutional court in the sense of  exercising final judgment 
about the constitutionality of  laws. See cOnstitutiOn OF FRance, arts. 56–63.
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been willing to tolerate the devolution of  at least some asymmetrical competen-
cies to Corsica, this provision went too far. The court based its decision largely on 
the principle of  the indivisibility of  the French people. The court read Article 1 to 
establish the existence within the French people of  a constituent part (a sort of  
subdivision), the “Corsican people,” an act that contravened constitutional prin-
ciples asserting the uniqueness of  the French people, consecrating the indivisibil-
ity of  the Republic, and identifying the French people as a whole as the bearers of  
national sovereignty.41 Where the expression “the people” applies to the French 
people, the court held, it must be considered a unitary category incapable of  sub-
division by law.
The court also emphasized the constitutional obligation of  France, as an indivisible, 
secular, democratic, and social republic, to ensure the equality of  all citizens before the 
law, without distinction of  origin. The law’s characterization of  the “Corsican people” 
as a “part of  the French people,” the court held, violated this principle, which recog-
nizes only the French people, composed of  all French citizens without distinction of  
origin, race, or religion. In the court’s view, to define Corsicans as a “people” in their 
own right effectuated a kind of  discrimination against the rest of  the French people,42 
who received no such additional recognition. In sum, the provision was seen as deeply 
threatening to the coherence of  the basic French constitutional arrangement, thereby 
jeopardizing national unity.43
2.2. Spain and Catalonia
The origins of  modern-day Spain lie in “the vagaries of  dynastic politics and demo-
graphic reality.”44 From 1492 until 1712, Spain consisted of  numerous political 
communities enjoying varying degrees of  independence. After the War of  Spanish 
Succession, which concluded in 1714, the Crown of  Catalonia and Aragon lost its 
political and economic independence in favor of  Castilla. The Basque Country, in con-
trast, because it supported the winning side, continued for a time to enjoy substantial 
autonomy.45 Thus, the configuration of  present-day Spain, the degree of  autonomy 
enjoyed from time to time by its constituent units, and the nature and amicability 
41 cOnseil cOnstitutiOnnel [CC] [cOnstitutiOnal cOuRt] Decision no. 91–290 DC, May 9, 1991, ¶¶ 11–14.
42 “Une régime discriminatoire,” id., ¶ 22.
43 The court also invalidated some aspects of  the statutory devolution of  authority to Corsica. See id., ¶¶ 51, 
55, 59. Following these events, negotiations between Paris and Corsica continued. In 1999, a summit 
between the State government, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, and representatives of  Corsica initiated the 
“Matignon process,” culminating in a new statute granting Corsica various forms of  autonomy. Daftery, 
supra note 21. Several important provisions of  this law were invalidated by the Conseil constitutionnel. 
See CC, Decision No. 2001–454 DC, Jan. 17, 2002. In 2003, the National Assembly enacted a new decen-
tralization law, Law No. 2003–276 of  Mar. 28, 2003, but an attempt by the Corsican government to 
invoke it was defeated in a referendum. See 2002: Des pouvoirs renforcés, cOllectivité teRRiOtORiale de cORse, 
May 2, 2002, available at http://www.corse.fr/2002-des-pouvoirs-renforces_a394.html. In 2011, the 
Corsican Assembly enacted a law providing a roadmap for making Corse an official language by 2014.
44 William d. pHillips, JR. & caRla RaHn pHillips, a cOncise HistORy OF spain 82 (2010).
45 simOn BaRtOn, a HistORy OF spain 139 (2004).
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of  relations among its various components all result to some extent from historical 
contingencies relating to the military superiority of  one nation over another and the 
shifting fortunes of  allies of  various contestants in nationwide and European power 
struggles.
Catalonia, a populous and prosperous province occupying Spain’s northeast corner, 
has a long history as an intermittently independent nation, and indeed as an imperial 
power in its own right. Its indigenous language is Catalan, a language suppressed for 
decades by the Franco regime during the mid-twentieth century, and it claims a cul-
tural patrimony distinct from that of  Castillian Spain.46
The present Spanish Constitution dates to 1978, but some of  its important insti-
tutions owe their origins to events surrounding adoption of  the Constitution of  
1931. The model of  territorial organization, in particular, echoes understand-
ings first reached between republican and leftist political parties in negotiations 
conducted in San Sebastian in 1930 (los pactos de San Sebastián).47 During these 
negotiations, the parties discussed both federal and regional models of  territorial 
organization for a future Spanish Republic. The final agreement declared the aboli-
tion of  the Spanish monarchy, the establishment of  public liberties, and confed-
eration of  the Iberian nationalities.48 Following a brief  but contentious period of  
misunderstandings and sometimes tense negotiations between representatives of  
Madrid and Barcelona,49 a newly elected Catalan government joined the Spanish 
Republic. Its authority was set out in a Statute of  Autonomy, which was approved 
by popular referendum in Catalonia and ratified by the future Spanish Constituent 
Assembly.50
Shortly thereafter, in the summer of  1931, the parliament in Madrid adopted the 
Constitution of  the Second Spanish Republic, which declared Spain to be “an ‘inte-
gral’ State, compatible with the autonomy of  the towns and regions,”51 a concept 
that placed its territorial organization somewhere between unitary and federal,52 and 
prefigured the arrangements adopted in the current Constitution of  1978. Following 
46 In its modern, self-conscious form, Catalan nationalism dates approximately to the beginning of  the 
twentieth century, where the deliberate cultivation of  a distinct cultural identity became a project of  
“Catalan intellectuals.” catalOnia: a euROpean HistORy 113 (Ramon Grau & Josep M. Muñoz eds., 2006).
47 adOlFO HeRnández laFuente, autOnOmía e integRación en la segunda RepúBlica 23 (1980).
48 Id. at 30. It is also important to remark that the most important leftist party in Spain in 1931, the Spanish 
Party (PSOE), did not ratify the agreement.
49 In April of  1931, Francesc Macià, the Catalan leader, briefly proclaimed an independent Catalan 
Republic. The Spanish provisional government in Madrid rejected this proclamation and sent emissaries 
to Barcelona to urge the Catalan leadership to adhere to the agreements reached at San Sebastian. After 
tense negotiations, the Catalan leadership agreed to join the new Spanish Republic. See alFOnsO Xiii, un 
pOlíticO en el tROnO (Javier Moreno Luzón ed., 2003); HeRnández laFuente, supra note 47, at 25.
50 See cOmellas JOse luis, HistORia de españa mOdeRna y cOntempORanea (2003); piO mORa, el deRRumBe de la 
segunda RepúBlica y la gueRRa civil (2001); Vergés Oriol & Cruañas Josep, The Generalitat in the History of  
Catalonia, Dept. de Cultura de la Generalitat de Catalunya, University of  Indiana, 2001.
51 cOnstitutiOn OF tHe secOnd spanisH RepuBlic (1931), art. 1.
52 As will be seen below, this model was followed by the Italian Constitution of  1947 with its “regional” 
organization. See Juan Ferrando Badía, Teoría y Realidad del Estado Autonómico, 3 Rata de Revista de pOlítica 
cOmpaRada III, 38 (1980–1981); see also cesaR aguadO RenedO, lOs estatutOs de autOnOmia en italia (1998).
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adoption of  the 1931 constitution, the Spanish Parliament approved a new Statute of  
Autonomy for Catalonia—one more limited in scope than Catalonia had sought53—
that defined Catalonia as an autonomous region within the Spanish State.54
The successful evolution of  a Spanish democratic state was disrupted at this point 
by several events including a sudden unilateral declaration of  Catalan secession in 
1934 by President Lluis Companys,55 the Spanish Civil War,56 and the Franco dicta-
torship. When the process was resumed in 1975 after the fall of  Franco, Spain’s 1978 
Constitution carried forward the suspended effort to establish a modern state that gave 
adequate recognition to the pluralism and diversity of  its society. However, the new 
context was different: because of  fears in many quarters that the sudden easing of  
decades of  central repression might lead to a rapid disintegration of  a refounded, dem-
ocratic Spanish state, care was taken to assure strong central control of  the process.
In consequence, the present Spanish Constitution begins with an emphatic state-
ment of  national identity. “National sovereignty,” it proclaims, “belongs to the 
Spanish people, from whom all state powers emanate.”57 “The Constitution,” it goes 
on, “is based on the indissoluble unity of  the Spanish Nation.”58 Despite this funda-
mental commitment to a national model, the Spanish Constitution contains elaborate 
provisions authorizing a substantial degree of  decentralization of  power. Specifically, 
the Spanish Constitution “recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government 
of  the nationalities and regions of  which it is composed.”59 An entire chapter of  the 
Constitution makes good on this promise by recognizing the “right to self-government” 
of  Autonomous Communities (Communidades Autónomas).60 However, unlike constitu-
tions of  fully federal states, the Spanish Constitution does not guarantee the autonomy, 
or even the existence, of  any particular subnational region. Rather, the Constitution 
delegates all decisions to recognize and empower Autonomous Communities to the 
Spanish Parliament (Cortes Generales) as a matter of  legislative discretion through a 
process of  central legislative approval of  proposed subnational Statutes of  Autonomy 
(Estatutos de Autonomías),61 as well as any subsequent amendments to the Statutes.62
Catalonia’s first Statute of  Autonomy, approved in 1979, was modest in its claims. 
Article 1 of  the Statute defined Catalonia as a “Nationality,” but this language was 
designed to be consistent with Article 2 of  the Spanish Constitution, which used 
the same term for essentially the same purpose, and raised no concerns in Madrid. 
53 Antònia Pallach, La Identitat Catalana: El Fet Diferencial: Assaig de Definició 280 (2000); Enciclopèdia.
cat, Estatut de Catalunya del 1932, available at http://www.enciclopedia.cat/EC-GEC-0025216.xml.
54 A comparison between the text approved by the Catalan citizenship and public organizations and the 
text passed by the Spanish Parliament is available at http://www.vilaweb.cat/media/attach/vwedts/docs/
comparativaestatut.pdf.
55 aRnau gOnzález & gisela BOu, la cReació del mite de lluis cOmpanys, el 6 d’OctuBRe de 1934 i la deFensa de 
cOmpanys (2007)
56 JuliO gil pecHaRROmán, la segunda RepúBlica (1989).




60 Id., art. 143(1).
61 Id., arts. 144(1), 151(2)(ii), 151(2)(v).
62 Id., art. 147(3).
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Sentiments of  Catalan nationalism, however, increased over the ensuing decades, 
and by the beginning of  the new century political pressure in Catalonia to alter the 
existing relationship with the Spanish state had grown too intense to resist. Catalan 
governments began to speak openly of  seeking greater subnational autonomy, and 
there was even talk of  secession. Under the Spanish Constitution, however, approval 
of  the Spanish Parliament was necessary to amend the Catalan Statute of  Autonomy, 
and central Spanish governments, often controlled by the conservative Partido Popular, 
were resistant to any sign of  resurgent Catalan nationalism.
In the mid-2000s, however, changes of  partisan control at both levels presented an 
opportunity. The major Catalan nationalist party, Convergència i Unió, assumed control 
of  the Catalan Parliament (Generalitat) on a platform committed to seeking changes 
in the existing relationship with Spain. In 2004, the left-leaning Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, or PSOE) assumed control in Madrid 
with the support of  Catalan deputies. This change in the political landscape created 
an opening for an agreement amending the Catalan Statute of  Autonomy, an oppor-
tunity that the Catalan government immediately seized.
In 2005, Catalonia proposed a new Statute of  Autonomy that aggressively asserted 
an integrated set of  very strong and interactive DIS claims. The Preamble provided 
that “Catalonia’s self-government is founded on the Constitution, and also on the his-
torical rights of  the Catalan people, which, in the framework of  the Constitution, give 
rise to recognition in this Statute of  the unique position of  the Catalan Government.” 
It claimed that “Catalonia [is] a nation”; that Article 2 of  the Spanish Constitution 
“recognizes the national reality of  Catalonia as a nationality”; and that the new 
Statute of  Autonomy fulfills “the inalienable right of  Catalonia to self-government.”63
Article 1 of  the Statute provides that “Catalonia, as a nation, exercises its self-gov-
ernment by constituting itself  as an Autonomous Community.”64 Article 3 declares 
that “The relations between the Generalitat and the State are founded on the principle 
of  mutual institutional loyalty and are governed by . . . the principle of  autonomy, that 
of  bilateralism and also that of  multilateralism.”65 It goes on to state that “Catalonia 
has its geographical and political space of  reference in the State and the European 
Union and incorporates the values, principles and obligations that derive from the fact 
of  being part of  them.”66 Article 5 asserts that Catalan “self-government . . . is also 
founded on the historic rights of  the Catalan people.”67 These are clearly provocative 
assertions.
The Statute goes on at considerable length in this manner. It provides that “Spanish cit-
izens” resident in Catalonia “enjoy the political status . . . of  Catalan citizens.”68 It names 
the Catalan flag as a “national symbol,”69 and creates a right of  “citizens of  Catalonia” 
63 Organic Law No. 6/2006 of  July 19, 2006, Preamble [hereinafter Catalan Statute of  Autonomy 2006].
64 Id., art. 1.
65 Id., art. 3(1).
66 Id., art. 3(2).
67 Id., art. 5.
68 Id., art. 7(1).
69 Id., art 8(1).
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to use Catalan in all interactions with public authorities,70 an obligation it purports to 
apply to all judges and judicial officers “who occupy a post in Catalonia,”71 presumably 
including national judges. It creates a “Council of  Justice of  Catalonia,” which it deems 
“the governing body of  the judicial power in Catalonia,”72 an apparent attempt either 
to establish an independent provincial judiciary or to assert Catalan control over the 
existing national judiciary, rearrangements that would challenge the regime created by 
the Spanish Constitution, which establishes a unified judiciary under central control.73 
Another provision declares that in areas marked by the Spanish Constitution for shared 
national and subnational power, ultimate authority to interpret the scope of  subnational 
authority lies with the Catalan legislature and executive, relegating the national govern-
ment and the Spanish Constitutional Court to establishing only basic or minimal rules.74
The proposed Statute, in short, offered a considerably different vision of  the status 
of  Catalonia within Spain than the 1979 Statute of  Autonomy, one that at a minimum 
proceeded to the very outermost limits of  subnational autonomy authorized by the 
Spanish Constitution. In fact, though, a better reading of  the new Statute, particularly 
in light of  the historical and political background of  its enactment, is that it rather 
straightforwardly attempted to extend the scope of  Catalan subnational autonomy 
beyond limits contemplated by the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Yet notwithstanding 
the ambitious scope of  the proposed alterations, the Zapatero government in Madrid 
approved the changes, and in 2006 Parliament passed a law bringing them into effect.
Almost immediately, a politically fraught lawsuit was brought in the Spanish 
Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of  the new Statute.75 In a deci-
sion that took four years to produce, the Court decisively rejected all the most sig-
nificant portions of  the Statute.76 Its strategy, however, was odd. Rather than take the 
Statute for what it transparently was—a rewriting of  the constitutional relationship 
between national and subnational power, approved by the central government follow-
ing bilateral negotiations with Catalonia—the Court chose instead to take the view 
that the Statute was the complete opposite: a well-intentioned and altogether minor 
alteration to prevailing norms and practices that suffered from clumsy drafting. Thus, 
the Court chose repeatedly to rely on a rule of  interpretation under which it construed 
language in the Statute, no matter how significant and challenging to the existing 
constitutional order, in a way that rendered it consistent with existing constitutional 
principles. A “maximalist conception,” the Court said early in its ruling, “must always 
be opposed.”77
70 Id., art. 33.
71 Id., art. 102.
72 Id., art. 97.
73 spanisH cOnstitutiOn, art. 117.
74 Catalan Statute of  Autonomy 2006, art. 111.
75 The plaintiffs included the opposition Partido Popular and the governments of  Aragon, Valencia, Murcia, 
la Rioja, and the Balearic Islands. On the political context of  these challenges, see Gardner & Abat, supra 
note 4, at 519–520.
76 S.T.C., June 16, 2010 (31/2010), English translation available at www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/
jurisprudencia/restrad/Paginas/JCC2862010en.aspx.
77 Id., ¶ 6.
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The Court’s approach is evident from the beginning. Constitutional challenges to 
strong language in the preamble were rejected on the ground that preambles have no 
binding legal effect.78 Similarly, the Court sustained Article 5, which declared “the self-
government of  Catalonia” to be “based on the historical rights of  the Catalan People.” 
This provision, the Court said, “would be clearly unconstitutional if  it attempted to 
gain for the Statute of  Autonomy a foundation outside the Constitution.”79 Although 
the deeply nationalist context in which the Statute was drafted suggests precisely that 
meaning, the Court went on instead to hold that “the entire language of  the provi-
sion allows that interpretation to be ruled out.” The phrase “historical rights,” the 
Court said, must refer only to “rights and traditions of  private law” or perhaps to forms 
of  public law uncontroversially within the control of  Autonomous Communities 
under the Spanish Constitution.80 To understand the rights in question as “legally a 
foundation for the self-government of  Catalonia” would thus be to understand them 
“incorrectly.”81 Similarly, provisions of  the Statute elevating the status of  the Catalan 
language were interpreted away as merely offering “a linguistic option.”82
The opinion goes on in this vein for another 137 paragraphs, interpreting contex-
tually significant language to have no significance, and very occasionally invalidat-
ing a provision of  the Statute when it is susceptible to no saving interpretation. As 
Giacomo Delledonne aptly observes, the Court’s approach is that “any norms which 
may appear a legal contribution to the building up of  a Catalan nation, if  they can-
not be interpreted consistently with the Constitution, are illegitimate or without legal 
value.”83 While the Court’s hostility to Catalonia’s DIS claim—and its official recogni-
tion by Spain—is thus covered by a thin veneer of  polite condescension, it is hostility 
nonetheless.84
2.3. Italy and Sardinia
Modern Italy was created between about 1860 and 1870 by the military unification 
of  the various cities, duchies, and kingdoms that for centuries had occupied the pen-
insula.85 Its establishment has thus from the beginning required a deliberate program 
of  nation-building designed to impose central control over a diverse and sometimes 
unruly collection of  communities with long histories of  political, cultural, and linguis-
tic independence. As Massimo d’Azeglio, a writer and politician of  the Italian found-
ing period, summed up the dilemma of  Italy’s creators, “Having made Italy, we must 
78 Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
79 Id., ¶ 10.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id., ¶ 21.
83 Giacomo Delledonne, Speaking in the Name of  the Constituent Power: The Spanish Constitutional Court and the 
New Catalan Estatut, 3 peRspectives On FedeRalism 1, 9 (2011).
84 Interestingly, provisions similar to those invalidated in the Catalan Statute of  Autonomy had not previ-
ously been thought to present constitutional problems in the Statutes of  Autonomy of  other Autonomous 
Communities. See Gardner & Abat, supra note 4, at 519.
85 lucy Riall, RisORgimentO: tHe HistORy OF italy FROm napOleOn tO natiOn state 32–36 (2009).
Distinctive identity claims in federal systems: Judicial policing of  subnational variance 393
now make Italians.”86 Italy’s contemporary history has accordingly been one of  peri-
odic struggle to establish a satisfactory and sustainable balance between national and 
subnational loyalties and institutions of  governance.
For many decades, Italy’s leaders focused their attention primarily on the task of  
establishing effective central control, deliberately appropriating aspects of  the French 
model of  “centralized and bureaucratic administration.”87 Following the Second 
World War and the collapse of  the highly centralized Fascist regime, however, Italy 
chose a different path. The 1948 Constitution, still in force today, “represented a com-
promise between the centralized State, which had existed in Italy since unification, 
and a looser federal State.”88 The Italian Constitution thus opens with a declaration 
that “Sovereignty belongs to the [whole] people and is exercised by the [whole] people 
in the forms and within the limits of  the Constitution,”89 a provision gesturing toward 
a central form of  organization. At the same time, however, it provides that Italy “is 
composed of  Municipalities, Provinces, Metropolitan Cities, Regions and the State,” 
and describes these subnational units as “autonomous entities having their own stat-
utes, powers and functions,”90 a provision establishing some significant degree of  
decentralized regionalism.
This regionalization, moreover, is asymmetrical: five regions of  Italy are expressly 
granted “special forms and conditions of  autonomy.”91 Pursuant to this grant, the 
“special” regions are authorized to adopt statutes of  autonomy which, like their 
Spanish counterparts, must be approved by both the regional parliament and by the 
national Parliament as a “constitutional law.”92 Adoption of  such a statute authorizes 
the special region to assume various powers of  local self-governance that would oth-
erwise be exercised by the central government.
One of  these “special” regions is Sardinia, a large island of  about two million inhab-
itants lying off  the west coast of  Italy and the south coast of  Corsica, from which it 
is separated by only a few miles of  open water. Although it has been “traditionally 
isolated from the mainland,”93 Sardinia, like much of  modern Italy, has been a site 
of  frequent political conflict, having been at various times occupied by, incorporated 
into, or allied with Rome, the Vandals, Byzantium, Arab states, Genoa, Pisa, Spain, the 
Holy Roman Empire, Savoy, Piedmont, and of  course Italy.94 In spite of  this constant 
ferment in its political identity, or perhaps because of  it, the residents of  Sardinia have 
86 “Fatta l’Italia, dobbiamo fare gli italiani,” quoted in ROBeRt d.  putnam, making demOcRacy WORk: civic 
tRaditiOns in mOdeRn italy 18 (1993).
87 Palermo, supra note 16, at 238.
88 Martin A. Rogoff, Federalism in Italy and the Relevance of  the American Experience, 12 tulane euR. & civ. 
l. FORum 65, 68 (1997).
89 cOnstitutiOn OF italy, art. 1.
90 Id., art. 114.
91 Id., art. 116. The five regions are Friuli–Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino–Alto Adige/Südtirol and 
Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste. Id.
92 Id.
93 Palermo, supra note 16, at 247.
94 eRic WHelptOn, a cOncise HistORy OF italy (1964); a sHORt HistORy OF italy (Harry Hearder & Daniel Phillip 
Waley eds., 1966).
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retained a distinctive culture95 and among them speak several languages now consid-
ered by UNESCO to be endangered.96
Sardinian nationalism has waxed and waned over the last century. A burst of  such 
nationalism was responsible for Sardinia’s designation as a special region in the 1948 
Constitution.97 Temporarily satisfied by this concession, Sardinians gravitated away 
from the Sardinian Party of  Action (Partito Sardo d’Azione), Sardinia’s main nation-
alist party, but nationalist sentiments enjoyed a resurgence during the 1960s.98 By 
the 1970s, repackaged in cultural and anti-colonial terms, Sardinian nationalism 
embraced not only continuing and increased support for federal-style devolution and 
regional autonomy but also at times support for outright independence.99
Nationalist sentiment sputtered again in the late 1970s and 1980s due to a combina-
tion of  Sardinia’s economic dependence on Rome and popular disillusionment with the 
nationalist parties,100 but it reignited following national constitutional reforms in 1991 
and 2001. These reforms implemented a long-term plan of  Italian “federalization” that 
narrowed the differences between the “special” and “ordinary” regions by authorizing the 
latter to assume a range of  competencies closer to those previously allowed only to the 
special regions.101 These changes “precipitated something of  a crisis of  identity in the five 
‘special regions,’ who [sic] were stripped of  their specialità . . . . In response, all parties in 
Sardinia . . . began advocating Sardinian ‘sovereignty’ and the rights of  the Sard people.”102
These sentiments eventually found formal legal expression in a new Statute of  
Autonomy adopted in 2006 by the Sardinian regional parliament.103 Drafted by a pro-
vocatively named “commission for drafting the new statute on autonomy and sov-
ereignty of  the Sardinian people,”104 the statute began by declaring the “autonomy 
and sovereignty of  the Sardinian People”;105 went on to describe “principles and char-
acters of  regional identity founded on autonomy and sovereignty”;106 and proceeded 
95 Palermo, supra note 16, at 247.
96 The languages are Campidenese, Logudorese, Gallurese, Sassarese, and Algherese Catalan. See UNESCO 
Interactive Atlas of  the World’s Languages in Danger, http://www.unesco.org/culture/languages-atlas/
index.php.
97 Eve Hepburn, The New Politics of  Autonomy: Territorial Integration and the Uses of  European 
Integration by Political Parties in Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia, 1979–2005, at 159 (Unpublished 
Dissertation, European University Institute, Apr. 2007), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/
handle/1814/6944/2007_04_Hepburn.pdf. See also giancaRlO ROlla, diRittO RegiOnale e degli enti lOcali 
75 (2009).
98 Hepburn, supra note 97, at 159.
99 Id. at 163.
100 Id. at 172–175.
101 These reforms produced the current versions of  Title V of  the Constitution of  Italy. See Palermo, supra 
note 16, at 239–240; Giacomo Delledonne & Giuseppe Martinico, Legal Conflicts and Subnational 
Constitutionalism, 42 RutgeRs l.J. 881, 891–892 (2011); Fernando Dominguez Garcia, Autonomy 
Experiences in Europe: —A Comparative Approach: Portugal, Spain and Italy, in One COuntRy, tWO systems, 
tHRee legal ORdeRs—peRspectives OF evOlutiOn 416, 417 (Jorge Oliveira and Paulo Cardinal eds., 2009).
102 Hepburn, supra note 97, at 175.
103 Legge regionale 23 maggio 2006, n. 7 (It.).
104 Palermo, supra note 16, at 247.
105 Legge regionale 23 maggio 2006, n. 7, art. 1 (“autonomia e sovranità del popolo Sardo”).
106 Id. (“principi e craterri della identità regionale: ragioni fondanti dell’autonomia e sovrenità”).
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to offer “other relevant arguments to define autonomy and the elements of  regional 
sovereignty.”107 Like its Catalan counterpart, the Sardinian Statuto “insinuated,” as 
Palermo observes, “that Sardinians wanted to exercise their self-determination inter-
nally and thus enjoy (special) autonomy within the Italian state.”108 Notwithstanding 
the Italian government’s official policy of  encouraging the regioni to assume addi-
tional powers and responsibilities, Sardinia’s proposed law was immediately chal-
lenged by the government in the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) on the ground that 
it exceeded constitutionally permissible limits of  subnational autonomy.
The ICC agreed.109 As in the French statute relating to Corsica discussed earlier, the 
key defects in Sardinia’s Statuto were its overreaching DIS claims, and in particular its 
references to Sardinian “sovereignty” and a “Sardinian people.” The Constitution, the 
Court said, “refers to regions ‘mentioning always and only autonomy and never sover-
eignty.’”110 The Constitution’s uses of  the term “people,” moreover, refer exclusively to 
“the entire national community,”111 not to communities resident within subnational 
units of  the state. Furthermore, implicit in the constitutional creation and empow-
erment of  regions is an underlying “principle of  uniqueness and indivisibility of  the 
Republic.”112 Sovereignty, by this principle, “must refer to the entire, and for this reason 
inseparable, national community.”113 Claims to constitutionally relevant distinctive-
ness or sovereignty, the Court continued, cannot rest on “ethnic, cultural, and envi-
ronmental elements,” for doing so would “define subjective and privileged situations 
for a category of  subjects of  the national set of  rules.”114
Finally, the Court said, the challenged provisions of  the Sardinian Statuto express “a 
conception of  the relationship between State and Region which is totally different from 
the regionalism envisioned by our constitutional system.”115 Instead, those provisions 
“connote, by their nature, extension, and quantity, a regional structure more from the 
point of  view of  federalism than from the point of  view of  regional autonomy.”116 Yet 
the Italian Constitution from its inception “excluded absolutely conceptions that could 
be even remotely ascribable to federal or confederal models.”117 Thus, the Court inti-
mated, Sardinia’s DIS claim, made in its new Statuto, represented an illicit, unilateral 
attempt to amend the national constitution outside of  formally specified processes.118
107 Id., art. 2 (“ogni altro argomento ritenuto rilevante al fine di definire autonomia e elementi di sovranità 
regionale”).
108 Palermo, supra note 16, at 247.
109 Corte Cost., sentenza no. 365/2007 (It.).
110 Id., Findings of  Fact, ¶ 1.2, quoting Corte Cost., sentenza no. 29/2003.
111 Corte Cost., sentenza no. 365/2007.
112 Id., ¶ 1.3 (“il principio dell-unicità ed indivisibilità”).
113 Id. (emphasis in original).
114 Id., Findings of  Law 1, ¶ 3.
115 Id., 4, ¶ 3.
116 Id., 6, ¶ 2.
117 Id., 7, ¶ 1.
118 Id., Findings of  Fact, ¶ 1.3. For critiques of  the Court’s ruling as going well beyond what was necessary to 
decision of  the case, see Omar Chessa, La resurrezione della sovranità statale nella sentenza n. 365 del 2007 
di 1, Le Regioni, 36 (1); Alessandro Mangia, If  federalismo della descrizione e il federalismo della prescrizione, 
6 giuRispRudenza cOstituziOnale 52 (2007).
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2.4. The United States and Texas
The United States is usually perceived to be culturally and linguistically homogeneous 
by global standards. This is not because the American populace lacks internal diver-
sity; a long history of  immigration (voluntary and otherwise) has in fact endowed the 
US with a fairly impressive ethnocultural pluralism. The impression of  homogeneity 
arises instead from the fact that American diversity does not for the most part track 
political boundaries. In the United States, distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious 
groups tend to be geographically dispersed, and even where they are concentrated, 
as in urban areas, they tend not to comprise majorities capable of  exercising political 
control at the regional level. That dispersion, combined with a longstanding national 
project of  assimilation, has tended to undermine the conditions necessary for eth-
nocultural distinctiveness to evolve into the kind of  substate nationalism sometimes 
encountered elsewhere. As a result, American states today rarely assert any kind 
of  distinct identity or sovereignty. On the few occasions when states do make such 
claims, they tend to be asserted either in circumstances where acceptance or rejection 
of  the claim is incapable of  issuing in legal consequences,119 or in which any legal 
consequences are confined to institutions wholly within the state’s control, such as 
the meaning of  subnational constitutions.120
There is, however, one important episode in American history during which some 
states did make highly significant DIS claims—the Civil War. Indeed, these claims were 
the most serious kind that subnational units in a federal state are capable of  asserting, 
for they were deployed to justify actual secession from the federation. Acts of  secession 
generally require justification. During the period preceding the US Civil War, and for 
some time even well after the war’s conclusion, Southern states sometimes justified 
secession on the basis of  a distinctive Southern cultural identity,121 which was said 
to be characterized variously by ethnic homogeneity,122 an agrarian way of  life,123 an 
119 In the context of  tourism, for example. See, e.g., Tennessee Department of  Tourist Development, History & 
Heritage, https://www.tnvacation.com/history-heritage (“A green, rugged land produced bold men and 
women unafraid to change the world. Wilderness roads became interstates, pioneers became politicians 
and Tennessee’s past gave richness to its present.”).
120 For example, state courts have sometimes claimed that subnational cultural distinctiveness requires giv-
ing a different interpretation to language in state constitutions than is given by the US Supreme Court to 
similar or identical language appearing in the US Constitution. See James A. Gardner, Southern Character, 
Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of  State Constitutions: A  Case Study in Constitutional 
Argument, 76 teX. l. Rev. 1219, 1221–1224 (1998).
121 Among the enormous number of  historical works to grapple with the question of  Southern distinctive-
ness, the most helpful include: WilBuR JOsepH, casH, tHe mind OF tHe sOutH (1941); aveRy O. cRaven, tHe 
gROWtH OF sOutHeRn natiOnalism, 1848–1861 (1953); COmeR vann WOOdWaRd, tHe BuRden OF sOutHeRn 
HistORy (rev. ed. 1960); clement eatOn, tHe mind OF tHe Old sOutH (1964); HOWaRd zinn, tHe sOutHeRn 
mystique (1964); david m. pOtteR, tHe sOutH and tHe sectiOnal cOnFlict (1968); caRl n. degleR, place OveR 
time: tHe cOntinuity OF sOutHeRn distinctiveness (1977); JOHn mccaRdell, tHe idea OF a sOutHeRn natiOn 
(1979); and dReW gilpin Faust, tHe cReatiOn OF cOnFedeRate natiOnalism: ideOlOgy and identity in tHe civil 
WaR sOutH (1988).
122 emORy m. tHOmas, tHe cOnFedeRate natiOn: 1861–1865, at 9 (1979).
123 Frank Lawrence Owsley, The Irrepressible Conflict, in i’ll take my stand: tHe sOutH and tHe agRaRian 
tRaditiOn 72–76 (Twelve Southerners, eds., Harper Torchbook 1962) [1930].
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honor-based culture,124 or a cultural predisposition to violence.125 Historians tend to 
view these claims with skepticism; Kenneth Stampp, for example, argues bluntly that 
“the notion of  a distinct southern culture was largely a figment of  the romantic imagi-
nations of  a handful of  intellectuals and proslavery propagandists.”126 Nevertheless, 
even if  Southern assertions of  cultural distinctiveness may in the end be unpersuasive, 
there is no doubt that the seceding Southern states made very real and serious claims 
of  political distinctiveness. Invoking the principles of  the American Revolution, they 
claimed a natural right to dissolve existing political arrangements, form a new civil 
society, and reestablish self-government in a form more to their liking.127
The American Civil War was of  course resolved through military and political 
rather than judicial intervention. Still, on one occasion shortly after the War’s conclu-
sion the US Supreme Court was called upon to evaluate Southern DIS claims against 
national constitutional standards. In Texas v. White,128 the Court decisively rejected the 
legitimacy of  those claims.
It is often the case in American jurisprudence that weighty and complex constitu-
tional issues arise for decision in disputes involving unrelated and even trivial issues. 
So it was here. In 1850, the State of  Texas, then part of  the Union, had settled certain 
financial claims against the US government by accepting federal bonds, redeemable in 
1865. Following its secession in 1861, the Texas government transferred the bonds 
to private entrepreneurs as payment for wartime supplies. When the war concluded, 
a new, pro-Union government sought return of  the bonds on the ground that their 
transfer by the temporary Confederate government had been illegal. To vindicate 
this claim, Texas brought suit directly in the US Supreme Court under a provision of  
Article III of  the US Constitution granting the Court jurisdiction over cases “in which 
a state shall be party.”129 The fate of  the bonds is unimportant. What mattered was 
whether a state that had seceded and been militarily conquered could be considered a 
“state” for purposes of  the Supreme Court’s Article III jurisdiction.
In a wide-ranging decision, the Court held that Texas was a “state” within the mean-
ing of  Article III and emphatically rejected any suggestion that Texas might at any time 
have acquired a political identity other than its identity as a member state of  the Union. 
The Court’s principal strategy was to draw a distinction between a political community 
and a government. A “state,” the Court held, is properly understood as “a people or com-
munity,” and it is the “people” rather than the government that comprises the state.130 
124 eatOn, supra note 121, at 297, 298.
125 FRank e.  vandiveR, tHe sOutHeRneR as eXtRemist, in tHe idea OF tHe sOutH: puRsuit OF a centRal tHeme 43 
(1964).
126 kennetH m. stampp, tHe impeRiled uniOn: essays On tHe BackgROund OF tHe civil WaR 256 (1980).
127 See, e.g., cOnFedeRate states OF ameRica cOnstitutiOn (1861), Preamble:
 We, the people of  the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent character, in 
order to form a permanent federal government, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure 
the blessings of  liberty to ourselves and our posterity invoking the favor and guidance of  Almighty God 
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Confederate States of  America.
128 74 U.S. 700 (1868).
129 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
130 74 U.S. at 720.
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On this view, the Court ruled, the United States comprises “one people and one coun-
try.”131 The relationship among members of  this demos, the Court said, is not “a purely 
artificial and arbitrary relation”132—is not, in other words, a matter purely of   rational 
choice. In fact, the relationship is organic, having grown “out of  common origin, mutual 
sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests, and geographical relations.”133 The 
Court’s foundational premise thus denied outright the possibility of  meaningful cultural 
differentiation.
Moreover, the Court continued, the Union itself  was perpetual—it was “an inde-
structible Union, composed of  indestructible States.”134 Admission of  Texas to the 
Union marked “the incorporation of  a new member into the political body,” and this 
incorporation “was final.”135 The state’s declaration of  secession was thus “null,” and 
“the State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of  the Union.”136 
Even popular ratification in Texas of  its secession ordinance did not and could not alter 
this relationship, which was at most “suspended.”137
It is true, the Court said, that during this period “Texas was controlled by a govern-
ment hostile to the United States.”138 Nevertheless, the Court’s analysis intimates, the 
proper way to understand the period of  secession and rebellion is not that Texans had 
grown apart from other Americans, or that they had either acquired or deliberately 
chosen a distinct political identity, but that the political community of  Americans 
living in Texas had essentially been taken over by a rogue and in some sense alien 
government. Following military action by the United States against that govern-
ment, Texans consequently “retain their identity” as members of  the American body 
politic.139
The US Supreme Court’s analysis thus denies utterly at every step the valid-
ity and basic assumptions of  Southern DIS claims made before and during the 
Civil War. There was no distinctive subnational identity, either culturally or politi-
cally. Since there was no distinctive identity, there could be no legitimate claim 
to self-sovereignty, and secession was therefore void, even when measured by the 
principles of  just revolution shared by all Americans. Instead, secession resulted 
from the hostile occupation of  Texas by a rogue and alien government—it was, 
as Justice Grier observed mockingly in dissent, an episode of  collective “insanity, 
and [Texas now] asks the court to treat all her acts made during the disease as 
void.”140 It is hard to imagine a more hostile judicial reaction to a subnational 
DIS claim.
131 Id. at 721.
132 Id. at 724–725.
133 Id. at 725.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 726.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 727.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 728.
140 Id. at 740 (Grier, J., dissenting).
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2.5. Canada and Quebec
By an accident of  colonial conquest, Canada has since its founding contained two very 
large and distinct settler communities: a linguistically and culturally British majority, and 
a linguistically and culturally French minority.141 Although members of  the latter group 
can be found to some extent throughout Canada, they are for the most part  geographically 
concentrated in the province of  Quebec, where they comprise a significant majority.142 As 
a result, whereas English is by far the dominant language in most of  Canada, Quebec’s 
primary language is French. Similarly, Quebec retains a civil law code and institutions 
inherited in great part from France, whereas English Canada’s legal and institutional 
inheritance derives from English common law and customary institutions.143
Although relations between French and English Canada have never been trouble-
free,144 things took a marked turn for the worse in the 1980s following consolidation 
of  Quebec’s “Quiet Revolution,” during which its populace came to a kind of  enhanced 
self-consciousness as a distinct cultural and linguistic community.145 This self-aware-
ness led Québécois to understand themselves to a much greater extent than before as a 
frequently overwhelmed minority in Canadian national politics and policy, a situation 
that in turn came to be perceived, with some degree of  alarm, as constituting a threat 
to the long-term survival of  Quebec’s linguistic and cultural distinctiveness.146
In accordance with this new self-understanding, Quebec’s leadership made repeated 
demands during the 1980s and 1990s for national constitutional changes that would 
give Quebec an enhanced status among the Canadian provinces, changes that were 
said to be necessary to furnish Quebec with tools adequate to preserve its language 
and culture from majoritarian pressures. On two occasions Canadian leaders reached 
agreements in principle that would have given Quebec at least some of  what it wanted, 
but the first deal was subverted by a sudden withdrawal of  approval by some provin-
cial leaders, and the second deal was scuttled by a failure of  popular ratification.147 
Frustrated by their inability to make significant headway in national political forums, 
Quebec’s leaders—along with a sizable segment of  the provincial public—began by 
141 kennetH mcROBeRts, miscOnceiving canada: tHe stRuggle FOR natiOnal unity 2–8 (1997).
142 Id. at 85.
143 Anglophone Canada is also predominantly Protestant, whereas Quebec is overwhelmingly Catholic. See 
David Cameron, Quebec and the Canadian Federation, in canadian FedeRalism: peRFORmance, eFFectiveness, and 
legitimacy 46 (Herman Bakvis & Grace Skogstad, eds., 3d ed. 2012), but the salience of  these religious dif-
ferences to questions of  subnational distinctiveness and authority appears to have declined substantially 
over the course of  the late twentieth century.
144 See, e.g., mcROBeRts, supra note 141, at 2–29 (describing numerous conflicts from colonial times to the 
mid-twentieth century).
145 Cameron, supra note 143, at 47–49; Alain C.  Cairns, The Politics of  Constitutional Renewal in Canada, 
in Redesigning tHe state: tHe pOlitics OF cOnstitutiOnal cHange, 95, 99–101 (Keith G. Banting & Richard 
Simeon eds., 1985).
146 Roger Gibbins, Constitutional Politics, in canadian pOlitics 97 (James Bickerton & Alain G. Gagnon, eds., 
5th ed. 2009); mcROBeRts, supra note 141, at 101.
147 peteR H. Russell, cOnstitutiOnal Odyssey: can canadians Be a sOveReign peOple? (1992); Gibbins, supra note 
146, at 106–110; Sujit Choudhry, Beyond the Flight from Constitutional Legalism: Rethinking the Politics of  
Social Policy Post-Charlottetown, 12(3) FORum cOnstitutiOnnel 77 (2003).
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the mid-1990s to talk seriously about, and even to make preparations for, secession 
from Canada.148 In response, national leaders asked the Supreme Court of  Canada 
(SCC) for an advisory opinion on the question of  whether Quebec could secede unilat-
erally from the federation.
In the Secession Reference,149 the SCC answered the question negatively. The court 
had no difficulty acknowledging the validity of  Quebec’s claims to cultural and lin-
guistic distinctiveness. Canada’s federalism, the court observed, is itself  a response to 
political and cultural diversity;150 federalism “recognizes the diversity of  the compo-
nent parts of  Confederation,” and “facilitates the pursuit of  collective goals by cultural 
and linguistic minorities which form the majority within a particular province.”151
While thus conceding implicitly that Quebeckers might have valid political rea-
sons to think secession justifiable, the court emphatically rejected the contention that 
Quebec could act unilaterally on such impulses. Although Canada is a democracy, 
the court said, and democratic majorities may express themselves in a federation at 
the national and provincial levels, the Canadian Constitution does not establish a sys-
tem of  “simple majority rule” at any level;152 the wishes of  majorities may be acted 
upon only consistent with broader principles of  the rule of  law and constitutional 
supremacy.153
A unilateral attempt by a province to secede, the court ruled, would therefore 
amount to a unilateral attempt by that province to amend the national constitution, 
an unauthorized method of  amendment.154 Secession by Quebec could in principle 
be accomplished lawfully, but only if  undertaken in accordance with the amend-
ment procedures provided by the constitution. Those procedures, according to the 
court, require ongoing discussion and the consideration of  dissenting voices;155 they 
require, in short, negotiation among all constitutional stakeholders.156 A  serious, 
 democratically persuasive demonstration by Quebec of  popular provincial unhap-
piness with confederation might be sufficient to invoke obligations on the part of  
other constitutional stakeholders to meet Quebec at the bargaining table.157 However, 
“Quebec could not purport to invoke a right of  self-determination such as to dictate 
the terms of  a proposed secession to the other parties; that would not be negotiation 
at all.”158 In short, Quebec may be culturally and linguistically distinct, but that dis-
tinctiveness entitles it to nothing except respectful attention; distinctiveness carries 
with it no entitlement to authority, power, or status, either within the federation or 
148 Such talks followed the narrow defeat in 1995 of  a Quebec referendum on secession. See 1 peteR W. HOgg, 
cOnstitutiOnal laW OF canada 142–143 (5th ed. 2007).
149 Reference re Secession of  Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
150 Id., ¶ 43.
151 Id., ¶¶ 58, 59.
152 Id, ¶ 76.
153 Id., ¶¶ 77–78.
154 Id., ¶¶ 84, 86–88.
155 Id., ¶ 68.
156 Id., ¶¶ 86–96.
157 Id., ¶ 87.
158 Id., ¶ 91.
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without it. If  Quebec’s distinctiveness is to carry any consequences, the SCC ruled, 
those consequences must be recognized in political negotiations carried out within 
the existing framework for effecting constitutional change. Until then, any actions by 
Quebec intended to precipitate secession would be unconstitutional.
2.6. Summary
Although the constitutional framework for allocating power differs in each of  our 
 sample states, and the political contexts in which that power has actually been 
exercised differ even more, the judicial analysis of  subnational DIS claims displays 
a remarkable consistency from one constitutional court to another. By way of  sum-
mary, we offer some observations about the key features of  the rulings just reviewed.
1. All the cases deal with legal formalization of  DIS claims, either in a document of  
subnational constitutional status or in a national law. Informal public beliefs 
about distinctive local identity and autonomy may well go much further than the 
formal legal claims made to courts in these cases, and indeed might well serve as 
a source of  lively and contentious disputation in the arenas of  politics and pub-
lic political discourse. Questions of  distinctiveness and sovereignty, however, do 
not get presented to constitutional courts until a threshold has been passed in 
which the claims are asserted with a degree of  formality sufficient to produce 
legal consequences.
2. All the cases discussed here involve construction of  the national constitution, and 
find inconsistency between it and the DIS claim; that is, the national constitu-
tion is invoked as a firm limit on the permissible range of  subnational autonomy 
and independence.159 In several of  the cases (Canada, Spain, Italy), the DIS claim 
is viewed by the court as proposing or asserting an amendment to the national 
constitution without the use of  proper, formal procedures of  amendment and is 
inconsistent with the national constitution for that reason as well.
3. The courts in our sample do not generally distinguish between the secession con-
text and mere internal jockeying for relative advantage within the state. Thus, 
DIS claims made for purposes of  internal positioning within the federation (Italy, 
Spain, and in the unitary case, France) are received just as negatively as those 
deployed to support actual or threatened secession (US, Canada).
4. The courts make no distinction between DIS claims made solely and unilaterally 
by subnational units (Canada, US, Italy), and negotiated deals where the national 
executive and legislative branches have agreed to recognize the DIS claim as 
legitimate to some extent, such as through the enactment of  a national statute 
embodying a bilaterally negotiated settlement (France, Spain).
5. The courts uniformly decline to exercise judicial restraint or to invoke available 
tools of  judicial flexibility. For example, a court might treat the outcome of  overtly 
159 The decisions thus seem to confirm a hypothesis advanced by Jacob Levy to the effect that one benefit 
of  federalism is that it permits internal variation, but only within a certain range collectively deemed 
acceptable. Jacob Levy, “States of  the Same Nature”: Bounded Variation in Subfederal Constitutionalism, in 
neW FROntieRs OF state cOnstitutiOnal laW 25 (James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi, eds. 2011).
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political negotiations between the central state and its component units as pre-
senting non-justiciable political questions beyond judicial competence. Or a court 
might treat decisions of  subnational governments concerning the scope of  their 
own authority as entitled presumptively to some degree of  judicial deference, 
particularly where that judgment receives the endorsement of  the national legis-
lature and executive. Or again, a court might treat constitutional rules concern-
ing the status of  subnational units or the allocation of  national and subnational 
competencies as ambiguous, requiring courts to uphold any interpretation of  
intergovernmental relations by other actors that is plausible and reasonable. In 
the decisions collected here, however, constitutional courts uniformly decline to 
invoke such tactics. Instead, their rulings tend to be harsh and categorical. Such 
rulings do not open doors, but decisively slam them shut.160
6. Finally, judicial treatment of  DIS claims in the four federal states (Spain, Italy, 
Canada, US) is no more generous, tolerant, or accommodating than it is in the 
unitary state in our sample (France). This suggests that the presence of  a formally 
federal or quasi-federal structure does not mitigate judicial hostility to formal DIS 
claims.
3. The unique institutional role of  constitutional courts
It remains, then, to explain two closely related questions raised by the rulings pre-
sented in the previous section. First, why do national constitutional courts display 
such consistent and unremitting hostility to DIS claims across such a wide range of  
circumstances? Second, why are national constitutional courts so much more hos-
tile to DIS claims than other organs of  national government such as the legislature 
and the executive? As shown above, non-judicial organs of  national governments are 
sometimes willing to negotiate, to accommodate, and even to help implement subna-
tionally asserted DIS claims at the national level. Courts are not.
We believe that the best explanation lies in the unique institutional position of  
national constitutional courts, and in the practices shaped by and incentives offered 
within that institutional position. We explore four possible arguments in support of  
this contention. First, consistent with conventional understandings of  judicial review, 
constitutional courts may for institutional reasons be more likely to understand their 
role as enforcing the constitutional bargain than as putting them under an obligation 
160 It has been suggested to us by commentators from the western side of  the Pond that this kind of  rigidity 
is precisely what ought to be expected from courts in civil law states, and indeed that such rigidity is an 
integral aspect of  the civil law method. Although we do not wish to deny stylistic and methodological 
differences between civil law and common law adjudication, we think the point greatly overstated. For 
 example, as Anna Gamper points out, in Austria—the home of  Kelsen himself—the constitutional court 
employs in federalism cases a “consistency principle” according to which the constitutionality of  a federal 
or Land law is, in doubtful cases, presumed to be consistent with the federal constitution. See Anna Gamper, 
Constitutional Courts, Constitutional Interpretation, and Subnational Constitutionalism, 6(2) peRspectives On 
FedeRalism 24 (2014). She goes on to argue that the Spanish Constitutional Court also makes use of  such 
presumptions, allowing it a similar kind of  flexibility rather than rigidity of  results. Id. at 9.
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to make the constitutional bargain work in practice. Second, because constitutional 
courts tend not to be repeat players in intergovernmental conflicts, they may lack 
incentives to display greater tolerance of  DIS claims intended by subnational units as 
moves in a long-term process of  intergovernmental contestation.
Third, as organs of  the national government, constitutional courts may have incen-
tives to favor the exercise of  power at the national level. They may also see national 
legislative and executive efforts to interpret or to seek accommodation within the 
constitutional structure as intruding on their own exclusive power of  constitutional 
interpretation, and thus have incentives to assert their own power over conflicting 
assertions of  national executive and legislative power. Finally, national constitutional 
courts may believe themselves to have a special role in the protection of  national minor-
ities, especially those that in a federation are weak on account of  being geographically 
dispersed. Because it may exclude many constitutional stakeholders, informal bilat-
eral negotiations between national and subnational officials may be looked upon by 
national constitutional courts with suspicion, causing courts to insist upon the use of  
formal—and more inclusive—processes of  constitutional amendment.
3.1. Courts as constitutional enforcers
Certainly the most obvious—but, we believe, ultimately unilluminating—explana-
tion of  why constitutional courts might behave differently from other national gov-
ernment officials looks to the distinctive nature and function of  judicial review in 
modern constitutional systems.161 That is, the main difference between constitutional 
courts and other governmental actors arises from the distinct methods by which each 
is charged to serve the public good. On this view,162 executive and legislative officials 
may be conceived as actors whose raison d’être is to use the tools of  legitimate govern-
ment power to promote the welfare of  the citizenry as directly as possible—to adopt 
good laws and policies and then implement them through the exercise of  public power. 
To ensure that the efforts of  these actors are confined to measures that will in fact pro-
mote the general welfare, however—to protect, that is, against well-intentioned but 
dangerously overreaching uses of  public power—constitutions impose constraints on 
the available scope and methods of  executive and legislative power.163
Courts, in contrast, may be understood differently. Although as constitutionally 
created institutions they too are designed to serve the public good, their principal 
161 See, generally, allan R. BReWeR-caRías, Judicial RevieW in cOmpaRative laW (1989) (analyzing judicial review 
as fundamentally concerned with enforcement of  the constitution as law).
162 It makes no difference, on this account, whether a constitution is conceived, in the fashion of  the 
Enlightenment, as a genuinely organic act of  popular self-definition, see, e.g., u.s. cOnst., Preamble (“We 
the People”), or, in the fashion of  political scientists, as a merely instrumental “constitutional bargain” 
among actors who wish to establish an efficacious vehicle for combining their efforts to enhance their 
welfare. See, e.g., edWaRd scHneieR, cRaFting cOnstitutiOnal demOcRacies: tHe pOlitics OF institutiOnal design 
217 (2006). Although the reasons for judicial review differ in each model, in each the function of  judicial 
review is the same: to enforce the terms of  the constitutional arrangement, however defined.
163 E.g., giOvanni saRtORi, cOmpaRative cOnstitutiOnal engineeRing: an inquiRy intO stRuctuRes, incentives and 
OutcOmes 196 (1994) (“constitutions are first and above all, instruments of  government which limit, 
restrain and allow for the control of  the exercise of  political power”).
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method is not to pursue it directly through the adoption of  beneficial measures and 
policies, but to do so indirectly by faithfully enforcing constraints that the constitution 
happens to apply to other actors in the system.164 Courts do not, in other words, need 
to think about what measures would promote the general good, nor should they.165 
Rather, they are required by their institutional role to presume that enforcement of  
constitutional constraints in and of  itself  serves the public good.
Although this view of  the matter is not without force, it does not in the end explain 
the rather strikingly rigid formalism exhibited by constitutional courts engaged in judi-
cial review of  subnational DIS claims.166 The fact that courts have functional obliga-
tions to engage in judicial review says nothing about the way in which judicial review 
is properly practiced. Judicial review may be strict or loose, independent or deferential, 
risk-taking or risk-averse, and so forth, and the particular approach to judicial review 
that a court adopts necessarily reflects a choice among the available approaches.167 In 
the cases in our sample, however, courts adopted an approach to judicial review that 
was for the most part strict, risk-averse, and undeferential toward the choices made 
by other constitutional actors. With perhaps the notable exception of  the Canadian 
decision, the rulings rest mainly on relatively rigid and uncompromising definitions 
of  subnational roles, distinctiveness, and autonomy, and largely reject flexible read-
ings of  constitutional language establishing the status of  subnational units in the 
constitutional framework. The concept of  “a people,” for example, is not read flexibly 
to include the possibility that a national people might without contradiction include 
a component subnational people, but categorically to exclude such a possibility. The 
concept of  subnational sovereignty is interpreted not to be capable of  coexisting with 
national sovereignty in a complex system of  decentralized authority, but as by defini-
tion incompatible with it. In short, the fact that constitutional courts, unlike other 
governmental actors, engage in judicial review does not go very far to explain the out-
comes and reasoning of  the decisions.
3.2. Lack of  repeat play
Another possible explanation concerns the different perspectives that judicial and 
non-judicial officials might bring to the phenomenon of  national-subnational dis-
putes. As indicated earlier, one commonly accepted and very plausible view of  federal-
ism is that it institutionalizes a system of  permanent intergovernmental contestation. 
In this system, national and subnational governments compete for popular allegiance 
not only by using their powers to advance the public good through direct, independent 
action, but also by using their powers to block or impede bad or contrary exercises of  
164 The great exemplar of  this approach is probably Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
165 In the United States, the democratically illegitimate substitution of  judicial for legislative judgment is 
known pejoratively as “Lochnerism,” after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), a case in which the 
US Supreme Court invalidated a law setting maximum hours for bakery workers on the ground that is 
was, essentially, unwise.
166 The charge of  formalism has been made explicitly by some critics of  the various rulings. See, e.g., Palermo, 
supra note 16, at 247; Chessa, supra note 118; Mangia, supra note 118.
167 edWaRd mcWHinney, Judicial RevieW 212–216 (4th ed. 1969).
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power by the other level. As a result, national and subnational governments engage 
in what might be considered an ongoing game of  positioning, claiming, acting, and 
blocking for the purpose of  advancing their policy goals as a means of  competing for 
public approval and advancing the public good.168
Because this game is primarily a game of  action, it necessarily involves mainly the 
executive and legislative branches at each level.169 It is these branches, rather than the 
judiciary, that have the institutional capacity and authority to generate and deploy 
public policies. As a result, executive and legislative officials at both levels are accus-
tomed to competing with one another. These are the officials who actually take the 
actions of  which intergovernmental competition consists—they are the ones who for-
mulate and implement policies, make claims and counterclaims about the allocation 
of  governmental authority, monitor and criticize actions of  officials at the other level, 
and develop strategies to obstruct bad policy decisions taken by their counterparts.170
A relationship of  long-term competition is nonetheless a long-term relationship, 
and people who are bound to one another over the long term, and who then encounter 
each other repeatedly in similar circumstances, inevitably develop a kind of  working 
relationship based on mutual knowledge, expectations, and understandings.171 As a 
result, the day-in and day-out complications associated with long-term competition 
may not bother them. On the contrary, they may come to expect it, and because the 
behavior of  their opponents often becomes predictable, it may lose its capacity to sur-
prise, much less to alarm.
For legislative and executive actors, then, a subnational government’s assertion 
of  a DIS claim need not be experienced as anxiety-producing. Instead, such claims 
may logically be understood as deployment of  just another tool in the ongoing process 
of  jockeying for advantageous position within the federation. Those who engage in 
permanent contestation must expect reverses and exchanges of  power and fortune. 
Acceptance of  a DIS claim need not precipitate the disintegration of  the federation, for 
any advantage accruing to the subnational unit today may be overturned tomorrow 
by some different strategy. If  the claim is denied today, the subnational unit may make 
up the lost ground tomorrow by different means. Thus, although national legislative 
and executive officials may be predisposed to resist DIS claims so as not to surrender 
ground, their status as repeat players who firmly expect to engage in additional rounds 
in the future may inoculate them against feeling that such claims mark any particu-
larly great threat to the system over the long term.
National courts, on the other hand, are in a different position. They are not typically 
involved in routine or ongoing contestation with subnational officials. Ordinarily, they 
are not in a position even to observe regular competition occurring between subna-
tional governments and their colleagues in the national legislative and executive 
branches. Instead, national constitutional courts become aware of  and involved in 
168 gaRdneR, supra note 7, ch. 2; BednaR, supra note 13, passim.
169 gaRdneR, supra note 7, at 87–99, 181.
170 Id.; nugent, supra note 14, passim.
171 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of  Legal Change, 9 laW & sOc’y 
Rev. 95 (1974); ROgeR B. myeRsOn, game tHeORy 309 (1991).
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intergovernmental competition only when a case reaches them, and even then their 
involvement usually is confined to adjudicating that single case.
National courts in federal systems, then, tend to be, in the language of  game theory, 
single-shot rather than repeat players.172 This experience, in turn, may give them a 
short-term rather than a long-term perspective concerning the significance of  various 
strategies of  contestation deployed by the different levels of  government. In particu-
lar, their role may predispose them to construe DIS claims more literally, and conse-
quently to treat them as more serious threats to the long-term survival of  the state, 
than their counterparts in the national executive and legislative branches. Courts, in 
other words, may honestly fear such claims. That fear could thus help account for the 
hostility to DIS claims observed in the judicial opinions reviewed in Section 2, and the 
rigidity with which the courts construe constitutional provisions dealing with subna-
tional identity and autonomy.
3.3. Lack of  impartiality
A third possible explanation for judicial hostility to subnational DIS claims might be a 
lack of  impartiality on the part of  national constitutional courts toward the outcome 
of  conflicts between national and subnational claims to power. This could manifest 
itself  in either a general preference for the exercise of  power at the national level or a 
more specific preference for the exercise of  national judicial power over the exercise of  
power by other governmental actors at any level.
Since the middle of  the twentieth century, government power at all levels has 
expanded considerably, largely due to an expansion of  common understandings of  
the scope of  the public sector as compared to the private sector.173 However, the expan-
sion of  government power at the national and subnational levels has not been sym-
metrical: “the experience of  most federations,” Cheryl Saunders observes, “suggests 
that central power is likely to expand, at the expense of  the powers of  the regions.”174 
Why this pattern has emerged is not entirely clear. One possibility is that solutions to 
various crises occurring during the twentieth century (a worldwide economic depres-
sion, two world wars, a global cold war, etc.) have required the exercise of  substan-
tial amounts of  power at the national level,175 and power once assumed by national 
governments is not then easily dislodged. Indeed, expansion of  the scope of  federal 
172 Galanter, supra note 171, at 3 (using the term “one-shotters”).
173 James BucHanan & gORdOn tullOck, tHe calculus OF cOnsent: lOgical FOundatiOns OF cOnstitutiOnal demOcRacy 
286–287 (1965); Alain C. Cairns, The Politics of  Constitutional Renewal in Canada, in Redesigning tHe state: 
tHe pOlitics OF cOnstitutiOnal cHange 97 (Keith G. Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 1985); scHneieR, supra 
note 162, at 52.
174 Cheryl Saunders, Constitutional Arrangements of  Federal Systems, 25 puBlius 61, 71 (1995). See also Mikhail 
Filippov & Alga Shvetsova, Federalism, Democracy, and Democratization, in FedeRal dynamics: cOntinuity, 
cHange, and tHe vaRieties OF FedeRalism 167, 169 (Arthur Benz & Jörg Broschek eds., 2013) (describing 
various “laws” of  centralization in federal states).
175 Arthur Benz, Regionalization and Decentralization, in FedeRalism and tHe ROle OF tHe state, 127, 138 (Herman 
Bakvis & William M. Chandler eds., 1987).
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power may hold great appeal to federal officials because it gives them greater leverage 
to deliver goods that help them get reelected.176
This kind of  reasoning does not of  course apply directly to judges of  national 
constitutional courts, who typically lack the capacity to generate “deliverables.” 
Nevertheless, nothing rules out the possibility that such judges might prefer, when 
faced with equally plausible choices, to direct powers to other national actors with 
whom they are allied politically or to whom they owe their appointments rather than 
to award such powers to subnational political actors to whom they have no strong 
ties. With the exception of  the Supreme Court of  Canada, which by law must include 
at least three judges from Quebec,177 none of  the constitutional courts examined 
here is constructed in a way that might encourage judicial responsiveness to subna-
tional interests. To the contrary, judicial appointees are likely to be individuals favored 
by national political actors, from whose ranks the appointees may well be drawn. 
Nothing in such an arrangement by any means guarantees that constitutional court 
judges will be more responsive to national than subnational interests,178 but nothing 
discourages such an outcome either.
Another way in which constitutional courts might come to prefer the exercise of  
national over subnational power arises from the nature of  the power struggles in 
which national courts may from time to time participate. National constitutional 
courts, as discussed above, do not typically have any reason to engage in contesta-
tion with subnational governments. On the other hand, they may very well engage in 
power struggles with other actors in the national government, and in particular with 
actors in the national legislative and executive branches.179 This may in turn cause a 
national court to react with hostility to deals negotiated between national and sub-
national governments if  the court perceives such deals as encroaching on its own 
power—in particular, the court’s exclusive power to interpret the national constitu-
tion, its only power of  any great consequence.
176 adRian veRmeule, tHe system OF tHe cOnstitutiOn 125–127 (2011).
177 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.  S-26. This minimal statutory requirement is supplemented by a 
strong historical convention of  appointing three judges from Ontario and two from the Western prov-
inces and one from the Atlantic provinces so as to achieve balanced provincial representation on the 
court. The chief  justiceship traditionally rotates between an Anglophone and a Francophone. See HOgg, 
supra note 148, at 243.
178 The great counterexample is surely the UK Privy Council, which over the course of  the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries essentially inverted the design of  the Canadian Constitution to convert it 
from one meant to create a highly centralized state into one that creates the world’s most decentralized 
federation. HOgg, supra note 148, at 125–126; peteR H. Russell, cOnstitutiOnal Odyssey: can canadians Be 
a sOveReign peOple? 40 (1992). Another, less dramatic, counterexample is the US Supreme Court since 
the 1990s, which has taken a series of  modest steps to curb continued expansion of  national power. E.g., 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); National 
Federation of  Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
179 This is the Madisonian conception of  horizontal separation of  powers. According to Madison, power is 
divided horizontally, among legislative, executive, and judicial branches, so as to institutionalize a system 
of  mutual struggle that keeps private liberty safe from excessive concentration of  government power. See 
tHe FedeRalist, nOs. 47, 48, 51 (Madison). As Madison famously put the principle, “[a]mbition must be 
made to counteract ambition.” Id., nO. 51.
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A court might take such a view if  it comes to suspect that negotiations between 
national and subnational governments concerning the identity, status, or autonomy 
of  subnational units amount to collusive attempts to amend the national constitu-
tion by informal and unauthorized means.180 In that case, permitting the national 
legislative and executive branches to engage in negotiations that informally alter the 
structure or meaning of  the constitution may appear to the court to amount to acqui-
escence in a usurpation by those branches of  power that properly belongs uniquely to 
the constitutional court in its capacity as the sole and final interpreter and enforcer of  
constitutional meaning. Thus, national constitutional courts may resist subnational 
DIS claims not because they are afraid of  ceding national power to subnational gov-
ernments, but because they are afraid of  ceding national judicial power to the national 
executive and legislative branches. In these instances, subnational units wishing to 
assert DIS claims—even those claims that might otherwise seem plausible or gen-
erate sympathy—may be caught up as innocent pawns in a completely unrelated 
power struggle waged on the national level between constitutional courts and other 
branches of  the national government.
3.4. Protection of  national minorities
A final possible explanation for the different reception of  DIS claims by courts and 
national legislative and executive actors focuses on the special role that national con-
stitutional courts may play in the protection of  minorities. Several of  the decisions, 
it will be recalled, treat DIS claims, whether made unilaterally by subnational units 
or bilaterally with the approval of  the national government, as attempts to amend 
the national constitution outside of  the formal processes provided in the constitution 
itself. By rejecting DIS claims on this basis, constitutional courts insist that all amend-
ments to the constitution proceed exclusively according to constitutionally approved 
methods. We have already examined this response as a kind of  judicial turf  protection, 
but there is another, more benign possibility: courts may insist on the use of  formal 
amendment procedures in their role as protectors of  national minorities.181
This may seem paradoxical. A subnational population claiming a distinctive iden-
tity or additional autonomy rights is a national minority; to reject its DIS claims is 
thus not to protect the interests of  a minority but to participate in crushing its most 
deeply held aspirations.182 Yet that view may be too simple. Nations contain many 
minorities of  different kinds. In a federal state, every subnational population is by 
180 The idea of  “informal” constitutional change—constitutional change that occurs without invocation 
of  formal processes of  amendment—is commonplace in the literature of  constitutional design. See, e.g., 
steFan vOigt, eXplaining cOnstitutiOnal cHange: a pOsitive ecOnOmics appROacH (1999); WalteR F. muRpHy, 
cOnstitutiOnal demOcRacy: cReating and maintaining a Just pOlitical ORdeR 333 (2007); Arthur Benz, 
Unsuccessful Reform and Successful Non-Reform—Constitutional Policy in Germany and Canada, Universität 
Osnabrück, Fern Universität in Hagen Research Paper, No. 21–23, 2008, available at https://verfassung-
swandel.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/paper-osnabruck-arthur-benz.pdf.
181 The U.S. Supreme Court has sometimes claimed such a role for itself. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 
152 n.4 (1938); see also kRitin HenRaRd, minORity pROtectiOn in pOst-apaRtHeid sOutH aFRica 203–204 (2002).
182 Will kymlicka, multicultuRal citizensHip (1995).
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definition a political minority. Moreover, not all minorities are geographically com-
pact, and thus able to wield governmental power in virtue of  controlling a regional 
government. Many minorities are geographically dispersed, and in a federal state 
are thus much weaker than those whose compactness allows them to control a 
government.183
The most common reason why governmental actors might be tempted to resort to 
informal methods of  constitutional change is the difficulty of  proceeding by formal 
methods.184 Yet formal constitutional change tends to be difficult for a good reason: it 
is the method that offers the most comprehensive and uniform protection for the inter-
ests of  all stakeholders in the constitutional order.185 The insistence by constitutional 
courts that constitutional amendments altering the status and autonomy of  subna-
tional governments proceed solely by way of  formal mechanisms may thus reflect the 
courts’ view of  themselves as having a significant role in protecting the interests of  
those excluded from informal workarounds and negotiations, especially other minori-
ties unrepresented in informal (and sometimes bilateral) negotiations.186
This reasoning appears most clearly in the decision of  the Supreme Court of  
Canada. In holding that multilateral negotiations must precede any attempt by Quebec 
to secede, the court explained that “[n]egotiations would be necessary to address the 
interests of  the federal government, of  Quebec and the other provinces, and other par-
ticipants, as well as the rights of  all Canadians both within and outside Quebec.”187 
“After 131  years of  Confederation,” the court continued, “economic, political and 
social institutions” are deeply entangled and secession would confront many of  these 
interests with “potential dismemberment.” “There are linguistic and cultural minori-
ties, including aboriginal peoples, unevenly distributed across the country who look 
to the Constitution of  Canada for the protection of  their rights.”188 A negotiated seces-
sion must, the court said, aim for “an agreement reconciling all relevant rights and 
obligations.”189 If  other national constitutional courts tend to share the view that one 
of  their important functions is to protect the interests of  constitutional stakeholders, 
183 Ronald L.  Watts, Federalism in Fragmented and Segmented Societies, in FedeRalism and civil sOcieties: an 
inteRnatiOnal sympOsium 145, 150 (Jutta Kramer & Hans-Peter Schneider eds. 1999); kymlicka, supra note 
182, at 29.
184 Nathalie Behnke & Arthur Benz, The Politics of  Constitutional Change between Reform and Evolution, 39 
puBlius 213 (2009); Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator 
Problem, in cOmpaRative cOnstitutiOnal design 195 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012).
185 Raymond Ku, Consensus of  the Governed: The Legitimacy of  Constitutional Change, 64 FORdHam l. Rev. 535, 
539–540 (1996).
186 It is also possible that, from a systemic point of  view, a system that simultaneously offers different 
approaches to DIS claims—here, one that responds to DIS claims with a mix of  political flexibility and 
judicial intransigence—just might promote maintenance of  a valuable equilibrium in a federal system. 
For example, judicial intransigence could establish firm parameters within which political negotiations 
may occur, thus influencing the likely outcomes of  such negotiations and potentially confining them to 
results consistent with long-term stability. Cf. Christa Scholtz, Federalism and Policy Change: An Analytic 
Narrative of  Indigenous Land Rights Policy in Australia (1966–1971), 46 can. J. pOl. sci. 397 (2013).
187 Secession Reference, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 92.
188 Id., ¶ 96.
189 Id., ¶ 97.
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and especially of  weak minorities, they may well have a special reason to dislike signs 
of  bilateralism in what they conceive to be a diverse and multilateral federal state.190
At the same time, however, this is precisely where questions can arise about the suit-
ability of  the constitutional court to play that role effectively. First, there is a poten-
tial question, alluded to earlier, about the composition of  the court: the members of  
the court might not be chosen in a way that makes them representative of, or even 
 responsive to, an appropriately wide variety of  interests. Second, there is a problem 
of  judicial choice: which minorities get the benefit of  the court’s protection, and why? 
Should the court look with solicitude on the interests of  the complaining subna-
tional population? Or should the court feel a greater obligation to minorities scattered 
throughout the national population? Which minorities, in other words, should be privi-
leged by the court, and why? A principled basis may not always be readily available for 
choosing one set of  interests over another when those interests come into conflict.
4. Conclusion
We have argued here that subnational claims to a distinctive identity or sovereignty 
(DIS claims) are often received with some degree of  tolerance by national legislative 
and executive actors, but are uniformly received with great hostility when asserted in 
national constitutional courts. In exploring possible institutional explanations for this 
disparate treatment, we are inclined to reject the view that judicial hostility is rooted 
simply in the nature and function of  judicial review in modern constitutional systems. 
Three other explanations, we believe, hold greater promise.
First, the isolation of  courts from the kind of  intergovernmental contestation that 
occurs routinely in federal systems may predispose courts to react to DIS claims with 
greater alarm and anxiety than executive and legislative actors, who deal with subna-
tional obstreperousness all the time. Second, the institutional position and composi-
tion of  national courts may make them either insensitive to subnational claims or 
much more sensitive to perceived encroachments on judicial power by other branches 
of  the national government, and this in turn might cause them to reject DIS claims 
not on their merits, but as a strategy of  horizontal contestation for power within the 
national government. Finally, national constitutional courts might see themselves 
as having a special role in the protection of  constitutional stakeholders, especially 
national minorities, and this might predispose them to prefer that DIS claims be made 
exclusively in the context of  formal processes of  constitutional amendment, in which 
all constitutional stakeholders are likely to enjoy maximum protection.
190 The Spanish Constitutional Court was particularly disturbed by what it conceived to be the assertion 
by Catalonia of  a bilateral relation with the central state. T.C.S. No. 31/2010, ¶ 13 (Spain) (“Obviously 
transferring this principle of  bilateralism to the relationship between the Government of  the Autonomous 
Community and the Spanish State would be constitutionally impossible, as it can relate with the other 
only in terms of  integration, and not of  otherness.”). See also id., ¶ 115–116, 120.
